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RETHINKING THE LAW, NOT ABANDONING IT:




In an extraordinary outpouring of work, John Witte and Jo-
el Nichols have offered students of law and religion a careful, nu-
anced examination of the relationship between marriage, religion,
and the law.' It is, Witte rightly notes, a close and complex rela-
tionship, in which marriage serves "as both a legal and a spiritual
institution- subject at once to special state laws of contract and
property, and to special religious canons and ceremonies .'2 For a
variety of reasons -including the degree to which marriage has
traditionally been woven into the legal framework of society with-
out losing its religious roots, and the shift of marriage as a legal
construct to a more privatized and contract-based status3 -a close
look at marriage and the law reveals just how complex the rela-
tionship between law and religion can be.
In their contribution to this Symposium, Witte and Nichols
examine these questions through the lens of one particular issue:
the place of shari'a, or Islamic law, within the broader Western
legal framework, and specifically the relationship between Muslim
family law and general marriage law. Despite their superficial
plausibility, Witte argues, none of the standard arguments in favor
of allowing some form of Muslim law to govern marriages in the
Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. I am grateful to the
organizers of the Faulkner Law Review Symposium on overlapping jurisdictions, to John
Witte and Joel Nichols for this and other opportunities to learn from their work, and to
my fellow commentators.
1 See John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, Who Governs the Family? Marriage as a New
Test Case of Overlapping Jurisdictions, 4 FAULKNER L. REV. 321 (2013) (citing various
works by Witte and Nichols, written separately and together).
2 John Witte Jr., The Future of Muslim Family Law in Western Democracies, in SHARI'A
IN THE WEST? 279, 281 (Rex Ahdar & Nicholas Aroney eds., 2010) [hereinafter Witte,
Future].
3 See id. at 282.
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West- "religious freedom, non-discrimination, political liberalism,
and religious autonomy"-fully explains or justifies this result.4
The issues raised in this area, he concluded, are deep and intracta-
ble. In the long run, these issues might be better addressed through
the same complex process of negotiation, compromise, and mutual
influence and accommodation that characterized, and continues to
characterize, the relationship between mainline Christianity and the
Western state over the past half-century, with respect to marriage
as well as many other subjects.'
I do not disagree with this broad conclusion. As a descrip-
tive matter, it seems true that the relationship between law and re-
ligion is just that: a relationship, one that is mutual and evolving
and cannot be characterized with rigidity or finality. As a norma-
tive matter, I am also sympathetic to the view that no single value
or argument is likely to succeed at providing a comprehensive "so-
lution" to the problem of church-state relations.6
A symposium would be of little use without a little disa-
greement, however. So let me focus on a couple of areas-one
narrow and one much broader-in which I depart from Witte's
finely delivered views.
I deal with the narrower issue in the first part of this com-
mentary. Despite my skepticism about "value monism" in law and
religion, as a practical and doctrinal matter, sometimes a single
value can actually be quite powerful in addressing a particular law
and religion dispute. So it is with the shari'a debate. In an im-
portant recent case, Awad v. Ziriax,7 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld an injunction against the so-
called "Save Our State Amendment," an Oklahoma state constitu-
4 Much of what follows is based on the speech delivered at the Symposium by Professor
Witte, a copy of which was made available to the participants and is on file with the
author. The final published piece by Witte and Nichols is different from, but not incon-
sistent with, those remarks. My remarks can stand on their own, but they are more re-
sponsive to the initial Symposium presentation than to the final, published version. See
John Witte, Jr. Address at the Faulkner Law Review Symposium (October 26, 2012)
(hereinafter "Witte Address").
5 See id.; Witte, Future, supra note 2, at 291.
6 See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION
xxv (2011) [hereinafter HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE]; Paul Horwitz, Law, Religion, and
Kissing Your Sister, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED
STATES: ACCOMMODATION AND ITS LIMITS 228, 247 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012).
7 670 F.3d 1111 (I0th Cir. 2012).
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tional initiative "prevent[ing] Oklahoma state courts from consid-
ering or using Sharia law."8 I argue that Awad represents one of
those church-state disputes in which equality is a well-suited ana-
lytic tool. Equality, by itself, may not be a sufficient or even co-
herent tool for every circumstance. But it did appropriate work in
this case.
More broadly, I want to voice my discomfort with the way
in which Witte, in his initial take at the Symposium, framed the
dispute between the state and adherents of the use of shari'a in
Western marriage law. "Shari'a advocates," he asserted, "have
given up on the state and its capacity to reform its laws of sexuali-
ty, marriage, and family life-and they want to become a law unto
themselves." 9 This is a strong statement, ° and a disquieting one-
particularly in the United States, which is not much given to Islam-
ic extremism and has been very successful on the whole in manag-
ing religious pluralism.
Although there are some grounds for Witte's description,
this is not the only way to see things. Thinking of the champions
of shari'a as having "given up on the state," or as desiring "to be-
come a law unto themselves," depends a great deal on how we un-
derstand those protean concepts, "the state" and "the law." In the
second part of this commentary, I argue that we need not think of
religious arbitration panels and other mechanisms of religious law
as an utter abandonment of the state or the law. Rather, we might
understand them as a challenge to what we mean by those terms.
They invite us to adopt a different and broader view of what con-
stitutes the "law"-and, perhaps, a more skeptical view of the
dominance of the "state."
I. WHEN EQUALITY WORKS: AWAD
A key trend in First Amendment law over the past several
decades has been the increasing prominence of equality as a central
justification for, and doctrinal tool in, the freedoms of speech and
religion. This understanding of the First Amendment dates back at
8 Id. at 1116.
9 Witte Address, supra note 4.
10 And one, in fairness, that is not repeated in Witte and Nichols' joint paper.
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least to Kenneth Karst's path-setting article on the subject," alt-
hough there were traces of this idea in the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court for some time before that. Although a good
deal of the scholarly literature has focused specifically on the rela-
tionship between equality and free speech,2 a substantial literature
has found the same trend with respect to the Religion Clauses. On
this view, both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause were once understood primarily in terms of liberty, or sepa-
rationism, or other values, but are now understood, by the courts
and others, as centering on whether a law affecting religion vio-
lates principles of equality. 3 Equality lies at the heart of one of the
most influential theoretical treatments of the Religion Clauses in
recent years, the "equal liberty" approach advanced by Chris Eis-
gruber and Larry Sager.
14
The equality-centered view of law and religion has been
subject to important challenges and critiques.15 In particular,
scholars have argued that such an approach falters because religion
itself is constitutionally distinct, and thus cannot be fully and
soundly dealt with through a leveling value like that of equality. 6
They have also argued, in keeping with a longstanding argument
11 See Kenneth Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI.
L. REV. 20 (1975).
12 See, e.g., id.
13 See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 9, 11-12 (2004); Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Trans-
formation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 673 (2002); Thomas C. Berg,
Religious Liberty in America at the End of the Century, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 187, 189
(2001); Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original
Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 10 (2000).
14 See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 51-77 (2007).
15 See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine: Equal Liberty and
Religious Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351 (2010); Thomas C. Berg, Can Religious
Liberty Be Protected as Equality?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1185 (2007); Kent Greenawalt, How
Does "Equal Liberty" Fare in Relation to Other Approaches to the Religion Clauses?, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1217 (2007); Abner S. Greene, Three Theories of Religious Equality . . .
And of Exemptions, 87 TEX. L. REV. 963 (2009); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The
Limits of Equal Liberty as a Theory of Religious Freedom, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1247 (2007);
Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1
(2000).
16 See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 15; McConnell, supra note 15. But see, e.g., Mi-
cah Schwartzman, What if Religion is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012);
Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (2013).
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about the "emptiness" of equality,17 that a rule of equal treatment
or nondiscrimination cannot stand on its own bottom, because it
depends on a host of contested questions about what constitutes
equal treatment or discrimination."
Witte's argument that legal deference to Islamic family law
finds no absolute defense in an argument from religious equality is
similar to the latter argument, although it is grounded more on his-
tory than on abstract principle. The equality-based argument for
respect for Islamic law in marriage, among other contractual ar-
rangements, contends that Islamic law and legal bodies ought to be
accommodated on an equal basis with other religious systems that
are given legal recognition, such as the system of rabbinical courts
to which some religious Jews turn in dealing with marriage issues.
As Witte has argued elsewhere, however, "[tihe current accommo-
dations made to the religious legal systems of Christians, Jews,
First Peoples, and others in the West were not born overnight.
They came only after decades, even centuries of sometimes hard
and cruel experience, with gradual adjustments and accommoda-
tions on both sides."' 9 On this view, one can argue that Islamic
law is entitled to be treated the same as other religious systems
within Western law, if it is like those other religious systems-but
they are not necessarily alike, because there has already been a
long period of mutual influence and accommodation between
Western legal regimes and those other religious systems. Islamic
law will have to earn its own unique place in relation to the gov-
erning law of the United States and other western legal regimes. It
cannot simply show up and claim equal status with other religious
legal systems that have a long and unique relationship with the
secular legal regime."°
Insofar as Witte is arguing that an equality argument de-
pends on the particular salient similarities and differences between
17 See generally Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
18 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Religious Freedom and the Nondiscrimination Norm, in
Sarat, supra note 6, at 195-201; Robin Charlow, The Elusive Meaning of Religious
Equality, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1529, 1529 (2005).
19 Witte, Future, supra note 2, at 288.
20 See id. at 289 ("The hard-won accommodations that modem Jewish law and culture
now enjoy are not fungible commodities that Muslims or any others can claim with a
simple argument from equality. They are individualized, equitable adjustments to general
laws that each community needs to earn for itself based on its own needs and experienc-
es.").
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the objects being compared, and that-even if we could agree on
what constitute morally relevant similarities or differences-we
would still have to dig beneath the surface to determine whether
Islamic law truly is relevantly similar to or different from other
religious legal regimes, I agree. The mere invocation of equality is
not enough. Even so, there are cases in which equality is both a
powerful and an appropriate tool. As it turns out, shari'a is one of
them.
Consider the Tenth Circuit's decision in Awad v. Ziriax. In
the November 2010 elections, Oklahoma's voters approved a state
constitutional amendment called the "Save Our State" amendment.
The amendment stated, in part, that Oklahoma courts "shall not
look to the legal precepts of other nations and cultures. Specifical-
ly, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia law."2'
A federal district court enjoined the amendment's operation, on
Establishment Clause grounds; the Tenth Circuit affirmed the in-
junction, using slightly different reasoning.
The appeals court relied on the principle found in Larson v.
Valente,22 a decision invalidating a Minnesota statute that involved
the imposition of reporting and registration requirements on reli-
gious fundraising organizations that sought more than half their
funds from non-members, while imposing lesser requirements on
religious groups whose fundraising came mostly from members.
The core holding of Larson was simple enough: "laws discriminat-
ing among religions are subject to strict scrutiny., 23 As the Tenth
Circuit rightly noted, that principle is an egalitarian one, and it is
the same non-discrimination rule that governs much of the law of
free speech. 4
The Tenth Circuit held that Larson's non-discrimination
rule applied perfectly to the Save Our State amendment. 25  The
amendment not only discriminated between religions, it actually
21 Awad, 670 F.3d at 1117-18.
22 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
23 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (quoted in Awad, 670 F.3d at 1127).
24 See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1128 n.13 (quoting, inter alia, John H. Garvey, The Architec-
ture of the Establishment Clause, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1451, 1463 (1997) (Larson is "the
Establishment Clause counterpart to the rule against content discrimination . . . in free
speech law")).
25 Id. at 1128.
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"specifically name[d] the target of its discrimination. ' 26 It clearly
barred courts from considering "only one form of religious law-
Sharia law., 27 To justify doing so, the state must satisfy the de-
manding standard of strict scrutiny, and the court concluded that
the state had failed to meet this burden .28
It is a tired truism that strict scrutiny is generally "fatal in
fact. 2 9 Strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal, however. 0 In a case
like Awad, it might, in theory, be possible to argue that there is a
compelling reason to treat shari'a differently than other religious
legal systems that Oklahoma courts are already accustomed to.
Presumably, such an argument would turn on the kinds of issues
that Witte raises: the particular features of Islamic (marriage) law,
its potential harms to women and children in particular, and the
degree to which the religious laws of faiths such as Christianity or
Judaism have already negotiated a stable balance of interests with
the state through long negotiation. So Witte might be in a position
to argue that Awad's invocation of equality, although superficially
attractive, does not ultimately resolve any questions. For two dis-
tinct reasons, both of which are relevant to Witte's project, I think
the equality argument in Awad was stronger and more important
than that,
First, the application of Larson's non-discrimination rule in
Awad serves a valuable information-forcing purpose. A strict scru-
tiny requirement in cases involving discrimination forces the law-
maker to justify the distinctions drawn between different groups or
behaviors in clear and narrow terms.31 Strict scrutiny analysis
forces the lawmaker to provide something more than vague fears
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1128-29.
28 See id. at 1129-31.
29 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
30 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). See also Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in
Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV.
793 (2006).
31 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2111-12
(2005) (noting that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause stands for a commitment to public
reason-giving that puts traditions to the test.").
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or overbroad generalities to justify its classification of particular
groups or behaviors, in order to "smoke out" invidious motives.32
Oklahoma could not come anywhere near meeting that bur-
den. 33 The state's only justification for the law was the generalized
statement that it had "a compelling interest in determining what
law is applied in Oklahoma courts."34 The state could not identify
"even a single instance where an Oklahoma court had applied Sha-
ria law or used the legal precepts of other nations or cultures, let
alone [any evidence] that such applications or uses had resulted in
concrete problems in Oklahoma. 35  Absent any such evidence,
there was no good reason-including the reasons adduced by Wit-
te-to impose an absolute bar on the use of shari'a law in Okla-
homa courts. Even if Oklahoma had been able to show the pres-
ence of real and immediate concerns regarding shari'a, the law
was not narrowly tailored to that end. It singled out shari'a in all
its applications, harmful or harmless, rather than specifying partic-
ular policy concerns, such as the fair treatment of divorced women,
and attempting to address such concerns for all similarly situated
women 36
None of this means that the kinds of concerns raised by
Witte are invalid, or that he is wrong to suggest that other faiths
have had some time to negotiate a reasonable compromise with the
Western legal system. He raises reasonable concerns on the first
point although I am less certain with respect to the second point
that those compromises are as stable and settled as he suggests."
Rather, my point is that the equality-oriented test the Tenth Circuit
adopted, drawing on Larson, forced the state to justify itself care-
fully before acting-and the state could not, or did not. As an in-
formation-forcing tool, equality proved to be a powerful instru-
ment in Awad.
32 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,226 (1995).
33 Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1130 (10th Cir. 2012).
34 id.
35 Id.
36 See id. at 1130-31.
37 See, e.g., Witte & Nichols, supra note 1, at 326 (noting that Catholic and Jewish Amer-
icans both, and fitfully, reached different accommodations with the state concerning
marriage than did Protestant Americans), 327 (noting the gradual erosion of even the
Protestant relationship with the state).
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The second value of equality arguments in Religion Clause
jurisprudence is one that has been given less treatment in Religion
Clause scholarship, although it has been covered more fully in dis-
cussions of the relationship between equality and free speech.38
This value has to do with the political economy of the Religion
Clauses. In modem free speech jurisprudence, the central rule is
that "government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."39 Content-
based laws, even if they cover a narrow amount of expression, are
highly suspect. By contrast, content-neutral laws, even if they
block a large amount of expression, are much more likely to pass
constitutional scrutiny. Thus, content-neutral laws may actually
limit public discussion more than content-based laws.4" Why give
stricter scrutiny to the less speech-restrictive law? One possible
reason4' is that, the narrower the restriction on speech, the smaller
the political constituency it affects, and the less likely it is that that
group will find any political traction in opposing the law. Con-
versely, a broad, content-neutral restriction on speech ought to
muster more effective political opposition, making it less likely
that the government can succeed in passing such a law for invidi-
ous reasons.
Similar reasoning applies to the Religion Clauses. The nar-
rower and more specific a restriction on religious conduct is, the
less likely it is to provoke serious, effective political opposition.
Laws that, by virtue of their neutrality, affect a larger number of
religious groups are more likely to breed political coalitions that
will unite to fight the law 42-or that will agree that some particular
38 See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 54 (2013) [hereinafter
HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS]; Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court and its
First Amendment Constituency, 44 HASTINGS L. 881,892 (1993).
39 Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
40 See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 197 (1983); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First
Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 128 (1981).
41 But not, to be sure, the only one. See generally Stone, supra note 40, at 197.
42 That is one lesson of the history of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or RFRA, a
legislative response to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held that neutral, generally applicable laws that burden reli-
gious exercise will not give rise to successful Free Exercise claims. It was passed by
overwhelming majorities in Congress at the behest of a broad coalition of religious liber-
als and conservatives of various faiths as well as civil libertarians. See, e.g., Douglas
2013
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restriction on religious conduct is actually justified for reasons of
sound public policy.
Awad's use of the nondiscrimination rule in Larson served
this second, political economy-oriented purpose as well. Muslims
are not, to put it mildly, a strong or numerous political constituen-
cy in Oklahoma. To the contrary, the prospect of a judicial deci-
sion relying on shari'a likely proved worrisome to the state's vot-
ers precisely because it was so unfamiliar. By requiring the equal
treatment of religion, the Tenth Circuit served the interests of the
state's Muslim minority by forcing the state either to leave it alone,
or to lump it together with every other religious group in the state
and thus create a powerful coalition of opponents to the law.
Again, equality served as a powerful tool here.
To this point, Witte, if he were inclined to sound a note of
caution,43 might offer two responses. The first is that shari'a, at
least in some forms and contexts, offers different dangers than the
use of religious law by other faiths. That may (or may not) be so.
But even if it were, the equality argument forces the state to justify
its restrictions by showing that it has a compelling interest in re-
stricting particular kinds of conduct, no matter who engages in that
conduct. The equality argument does not prevent the state from
addressing specific harms that the invocation of shari'a may cause.
But it does require the state to focus on those actual harms, and to
broaden the reach of its regulations to cover most instances of
those harms. Faced with such a prospect, the state will have to
convince a much wider constituency of voters and interest groups
that those harms genuinely demand political and legal action, even
if they too will feel the law's bite.
The second possible response is one that Witte adverted to
early in his remarks at the Symposium: try, try again."a If a law
that refers specifically to shari'a fails to pass constitutional muster,
then Oklahoma's voters can simply draft a seemingly more neutral
law-one that bars courts from referring to any religious law at all.
Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73
TEX. L. REV. 209, 210-11 (1994).
43 To be clear, Witte and Nichols agree that the Save Our State Amendment was uncon-
stitutional. See Witte & Nichols, supra note 1.
44 Witte Address, supra note 4; see also Witte & Nichols, supra note 1, at 273 (describ-
ing second-generation anti-shari'a laws).
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And, indeed, such laws have been proposed by state legislators in
the second round of attacks on shari'a.45
This is where my point about political economy enters in.
The broader the terms of such a law, the more likely it is to upset a
much larger constituency of politically powerful religious groups.46
Unsurprisingly, those laws have shown little political vitality. It is
much more difficult to pass a law barring judicial reference to any
religious legal system than one that bars the use of Islamic law
alone. In the Religion Clause context, equality thus serves an im-
portant dual purpose. When the state wishes to explicitly treat one
religious group differently from others, leaving that group at the
mercy of its minority status, it must provide powerful reasons to do
so. That is what Oklahoma tried to do in Awad, and its reasons
were correctly found to be wanting. The state's other option would
be to focus on particular harms without reference to religion and
without any hint of an underlying discriminatory purpose. Such an
approach brings more groups, religious and otherwise, within the
possible operation of the law. It may succeed in regulating such
conduct, but it will first have to convince a much broader constitu-
ency of affected voters and interest groups.
Again, none of this is meant to deny two of Witte's central
points: that there may be specific causes for concern about some
effects of the application of shari'a within the western legal sys-
45 See, e.g., Bill Raftery, Bans on Court Use of Sharia/linternational Law: Introduced in
Mississippi and Kentucky, Advancing in Florida & South Dakota, Dying in Virginia,
GAVEL TO GAVEL (Feb. 13, 2012), http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2012/02/13/bans-on-court-
use-of-shariaintemational-law-introduced-in-mississippi-and-kentucky-advancing-in-
florida-south-dakota-dying-in-virginia/.
46 And not just religious groups. The second generation of laws barring reference to
shari'a by courts have also generally barred the consideration of any "foreign" law at all.
As a result, such laws have also engendered the opposition of business interests within
those states, whose contacts and contracts often involve the laws of other nations. Those
laws are often honeycombed with exceptions, precisely in order to blunt this problem.
See, e.g., S. 4, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2013) (proposing to amend Alabama state
constitution to "prohibit the application of foreign law in violation of rights guaranteed
by the United States and Alabama constitutions" and laws, making clear that the amend-
ment "would not apply to a corporation, partnership, limited liability company, business
association, or other legal entity that contracts to subject itself to foreign laws"). But the
more exceptions there are, the less likely such laws are to pass constitutional scrutiny,
because the courts will be more likely to see them as instances of unjustifiable discrimi-
nation. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993); Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d
359 (3rd Cir. 1999).
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tem, and that equality alone may not fully suffice to justify treating
shari'a the same as other religious legal traditions. Whether one
shares those conclusions or not, however, the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion in Awad, and its powerful use of Larson v. Valente, suggests
that in the right cases we can give at least two cheers for equality.
II. BEYOND "THE STATE" AND "THE LAW"
My second concern with Witte's remarks has to do with the
rather stark binary he presented in setting up the question of how
western legal systems should deal with shari'a. "Shari'a advo-
cates," he said, "have given up on the state and its capacity to re-
form its laws of sexuality, marriage, and family life-and they
want to become a law unto themselves. 47 There are shades here,
as I'm sure Witte recognizes, of the Supreme Court's language in
cases such as Reynolds v. United States and Employment Division
v. Smith,48 cases that sounded ominous notes about the dangers of
positive religious liberty.
As in the last section, I do not deny that Witte's description
carries some force. Again, however, I want to offer a different,
and perhaps cheerier, picture here, albeit one that may be no less
difficult to apply in practice. I do so both because I think there is
some truth in my alternative vision (and some error in Witte's),
and because I think putting things in the way that Witte does may
ultimately lead to some unfortunate results.
It is common enough to see binary oppositions of this sort,
to be sure. Religious individuals or groups that seek special ac-
commodations for their beliefs, or that argue for some realm of
autonomy for religious organizations, are routinely described as
seeking to be placed outside or "above the law."49 And "the law,"
in such descriptions, is closely identified with the positive law of
"the state." To argue that there are realms in which the state ought
to or must defer to the customs and practices of religious individu-
47 Witte Address, supra note 4.
48 See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (worrying that a consti-
tutional right to a religious exemption from neutral, generally applicable laws would
allow the religious claimant "'to become a law unto himself"') (quoting Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)).
49 For a well-argued example in the context of religious organizations, see Caroline Mala
Corbin, Above the Law?: The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Anti-
discrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007).
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als and groups is to reject the state, and to become, literally, an
"outlaw." One either accepts the state and its legal regime alto-
gether, or one falls outside it. Law without the state becomes
something like lawlessness.
That is not the only way to frame the issue, however. Reli-
gious employers, like other employers, comply with countless legal
requirements imposed on them by the state. They have also argued
that they are constitutionally entitled to some exemptions from
positive law, such as the application of federal antidiscrimination
laws in cases involving so-called "ministerial" employees. They
might be wrong to make such an assertion-although the Supreme
Court has agreed with them.5° But that hardly makes them out-
laws, or requires that they be understood as having "given up on
the state."
Things are no different with shari'a. Those who argue, for
example, that a marriage contract might be interpreted with refer-
ence to shari'a where that contract provides for its use,5 have not
rejected the operation of the secular law in all things. Even with
respect to family law, it would be an unjustified exaggeration to
say that every advocate of some use of shari'a has abandoned the
secular law entirely. There may be genuinely illiberal individual
groups or individuals among those who have advocated for the
greater use of shari'a in the West, just as there surely are genuine-
ly illiberal Jewish and Christian groups and individuals. But it
would be wrong to tar Muslim advocates of some role for shari'a,
in family law or elsewhere, with such a broad brush.
There is a broader point to be made here as well, albeit it
must be made more briefly than it deserves. In thinking about
"what the law is,"53 we need not-and perhaps ought not-think
solely in terms of the positive law of the state. No matter how vital
the role of the state is, we should not think of the state as the only
50 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012).
51 See generally Nathan B. Oman, How to Judge Shari'a Contracts: A Guide to Islamic
Marriage Agreements in American Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 287 (2011).
52 I expand on the point, in various ways, in HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS,
supra note 38; Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial Exception, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 973
(2012); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and
Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009) [hereinafter Horwitz, Churches as First
Amendment Institutions].
53 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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or primary governing institution, or as the sole source of every-
thing we identify with the "law." Rather than picture our social
and legal domain in a more or less hierarchical fashion, with the
state dominating other institutions and maintaining sole responsi-
bility for forming and enforcing what we think of as the law, we
might more fully appreciate that our social world contains multiple
communities or nomoi. Each of these communities or nomoi is, in
some genuine sense, at least potentially a lawmaking community
of its own.5 Similarly, we might see our social structure as a
genuine infrastructure, supported not only by the state but also by a
host of other institutions. Each of these institutions in turn plays a
fundamental role in organizing and governing our collective life.
55
On that view, it would be a mistake to conclude that every
advocate of respect for shari'a-or every church that argues for
the ministerial exception, or university that argues for academic
freedom, and so on-has "given up" on the state or has moved
"outside the law." Advocates who take this position may chal-
lenge the state, and the extent of what Robert Cover called its "ju-
rispathic" reach.56 They may argue that there are meaningful
sources of "law" other than the state itself.57 But they are not, at
least as they see it, irreparably outside either the state or the law.
This is a cursory way of putting a complex set of ideas. It
leaves unresolved the many valid concerns that Witte raises in his
paper about the concrete circumstances and disputes that might
arise under a western legal system that gave some interpretive
force to shari'a, the inequalities it might create or exploit, and the
harms it might work. I do not mean to obscure or diminish those
concerns, and Witte's broader body of recent work explores them
with care and detail. I agree that they are concerns-concerns that
are often grouped together by political theorists as the problem of
"minorities within minorities. 58 I agree, too, that if these concerns
54 See generally Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1983).
55 See generally HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 38; see also Paul
Horwitz, The First Amendment's Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV. 445, 480-
82 (2012).
56 Cover, supra note 54, at 40-44.
57 See, e.g., ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF
AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012).
58 See, e.g., MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES: EQUALITY, RIGHTS AND DIVERSITY (Avigail
Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Halev eds., 2005).
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are capable of resolution at all, it will only be through long and
careful negotiation.
Still, one might make two additional points about these
concerns. The first is that they are shared by those, like myself,
who are inclined to question or reject too easy an identification of
the "state" with the "law," and who believe that there is a greater
role for non-state law and institutions than we often suppose.
When the law has recognized some scope for legally meaningful
autonomy on the part of religious and other institutions, it has done
so "within constitutionally prescribed limits"5 9 and with respect for
the distinction-however difficult it might be to draw, in theory or
in practice-between "outward" and "internal" actions by those
institutions.60 Those who take seriously the view that the state is
not all there is, that it is not the only meaningful source of law, still
generally display both a genuine concern for the rights of individu-
als within those separate institutions or nomoi, and a belief that the
state has a crucial role to play in safeguarding individual rights,
even if it requires intervention into those institutions.61
Second, even if Witte and I share concerns about abuse,
minorities within minorities, exit rights, and so on, it may still mat-
ter whether we frame those concerns in terms of being "for" or
"against" the state, or operating "within" or "outside" the law, or
whether we can find different and less stark language with which
to address these issues. It matters because, as Witte notes, these
kinds of issues are, in the long run, a matter for negotiation and
mutual influence rather than a single, final pitched battle. If that is
the case, and particularly given Witte's concerns, we ought to
avoid the kind of Manichaean language that could stall that dia-
logue. If anything, that approach could encourage illiberal groups
to become even more adamantly illiberal.62
59 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
60 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
61 See, e.g., Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 52, at 96-97
(summarizing the neo-Calvinist writer Abraham Kuyper's arguments that the state has a
role to play in protecting individuals against abuse within other sovereign spheres such as
churches).
62 See, e.g., HORWrrZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE, supra note 6, at 205-08 (discussing Sikh
case); Lucas Swaine, A Liberalism of Conscience, in Eisenberg & Spinner-Halev, supra
note 58, at 47.
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It is neither a light step nor an encouraging one to describe
one party to that discussion as having-given up on the state or tak-
en itself outside the law. I doubt that the groups themselves would
agree with that description. If anything, those groups would see
such labels as an attempt to get them to cede the very ground that
is in dispute. If we want to get negotiations off the ground-and I
take it that both Witte and I do-we may want to find different
language in which to do so.
